.”
Trujillo also believes that “there’s a straightforward argument that DHS and its components are exceeding their authority here.”
Fortify relies specifically on matching algorithms developed by the NEC Corporation of America, the US subsidiary of a Japanese multinational headquartered in Tokyo, as first reported by WIRED last month.
Testing by federal scientists at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, conducted with DHS and CBP, shows face-recognition accuracy drops sharply when images are taken outside controlled settings, including for top-performing NEC models. The tests distinguish between “high quality visa-like photos” taken in immigration offices and “wild” images captured in real-world conditions, such as immigration lanes or at registered traveler kiosks.
At ports of entry, CBP relies on tightly controlled visa photos: fixed cameras, cooperative subjects, neutral expressions, plain backgrounds, and uniform lighting. Images are rejected if a subject’s head falls outside a narrow size range. Even highly accurate systems, NIST says, struggle with poor framing or head tilt.
Street photos taken by cell phone lack those controls. Lighting varies, angles shift, and motion blur is likely common in the field, shaped as much by environment as the steadiness of the person holding the phone. High resolution alone does not correct for these constraints.
A WIRED review of recent face-recognition patents assigned to NEC shows the company’s technology is designed less to conclusively verify identity than to operate at scale under imperfect conditions. The patents describe systems that convert face images into biometric templates and compare them against stored records using similarity scores and adjustable thresholds, with the explicit goal of maintaining capacity when image quality varies.
The patents also acknowledge a core trade-off. NEC describes tuning match thresholds and system behavior to balance speed, scale, and accuracy, noting that lowering thresholds can reduce delays and failed transactions while increasing the risk of false positives, and that tightening them can have the opposite effect. Thresholds may be adjusted dynamically based on operational factors such as system load, frequency of use, or performance speed.
To support real-time use, the patents describe systems configured to stop searching after a short, fixed time window—on the order of seconds—if no match is found. In those cases, the system may still surface the highest-scoring candidate pair for human review, even though the score was insufficient for an automated match. Those limits reduce computing demands and enable rapid responses, but they also constrain how thoroughly large databases are searched, producing results that are suggestive rather than definitive.
NEC did not respond to questions about its licensing of facial recognition technology to US immigration agencies, including questions of how its systems are designed to perform in uncontrolled field conditions, what safeguards or usage constraints it provides to government customers, and whether it evaluates civil-liberties or human-rights implications prior to licensing its products.
Emily Peterson-Cassin, policy director of the Demand Progress Education Fund, a pro-privacy nonprofit, warned that unchecked facial recognition threatens free expression and civil liberties. “Privacy safeguards are essential to stopping wrongful targeting by unvetted tools such as Mobile Fortify,” she says, “and are the minimum protection needed to prevent this technology from becoming a choke hold on our most basic freedoms.”
In the days and weeks after the start of Trump’s second term, DHS officials began dismantling policies and oversight checks that had constrained the use of facial recognition, including those aimed at enforcing congressional mandated privacy protections. If DHS has an enterprise-wide policy today that governs when, how, and under what safeguards facial recognition can be used, it isn’t public.
Online archives show the last such directive, implemented in 2023, disappeared from the agency’s website three weeks after Trump’s inauguration. Among other constraints, Directive 026-11 stated that facial recognition should not be used as the sole basis for law or civil enforcement actions and that US citizens should have the right to opt out when collection isn’t for a law enforcement purpose.
“DHS has not publicly replaced its previous facial recognition directive, and it appears DHS has no policy or even restrictions on the use of facial-recognition technology,” says Jeramie Scott, senior counsel for the nonprofit Electronic Privacy Information Center and director of its surveillance oversight program.
The directive also prohibited “systemic, indiscriminate, or wide-scale monitoring, surveillance or tracking.” It said facial recognition could not be used to “profile, target, or discriminate against individuals for exercising their constitutional rights.” It forbade the use of tools that claim to analyze people’s faces to infer personal traits and characteristics (with a narrow exception for age). It also tied any use of facial recognition by ICE and CBP to a headquarters-level review and authorization process, to be carried out by DHS’s chief privacy and information officers, respectively.
Fortify was fast-tracked less than two months after Directive 026-11 disappeared, in May 2025. CBP and ICE privacy officers alone concluded that no new privacy assessment was required under federal law—an authority they did not previously possess. Records show that such determinations historically rested with the DHS senior director of privacy compliance, a headquarters official acting on behalf of the department’s chief privacy officer and independent of operational agencies.
A disclaimer in records first revealed by 404 Media documents the swap. CBP states that it “assumed responsibility for the review and adjudication” of privacy reviews on March 3, 2025, citing internal policy guidance issued by an office led by Roman Jankowski, who was appointed DHS’s chief privacy officer the day Trump was inaugurated.
Federal guidelines typically require a privacy assessment when an agency deploys a new technology that collects identifiable information about the public or materially changes how, where, or from whom that data is collected. They also flag “new uses of an existing IT system” that introduce “new privacy risks,” including changes that would open new avenues for data exposure.
Prior to joining the administration, Jankowski worked for the Heritage Foundation and its Oversight Project, where he was a contributor to the group’s Project 2025 blueprint for Trump’s second term. The document variously recommends merging ICE and CBP; weakening the department’s centralized oversight; and transferring civil rights and privacy review functions from DHS to the agencies it is meant to police.
“This cavalier approach to the use of facial recognition has real-world consequences to our privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights that are exacerbated by the undermining of what little oversight is in place,” Scott says. “The result, as we see with Mobile Fortify, is a failure to meaningfully scrutinize the technology.”
Senator Markey and colleagues this week introduced legislation aimed at prohibiting ICE and CBP from using certain facial-recognition and biometric surveillance tools, saying the agencies have built a sweeping surveillance apparatus that is being used far from the border to scan people without consent, accountability, or clear legal limits. The full text of the bill, short-titled the ICE Out of Our Faces Act, was unavailable at time of writing.
“Facial recognition technology sits at the center of a digital dragnet that has been created in our nation over the past year,” Markey said during a press conference on Wednesday. “It's dangerous, it's authoritarian, and it's unconstitutional.”
Originally published on February 5, 2026 by Wired.